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“It is obviously fair that where there is not enough of any 
essential commodity to meet all civilian demands, those who 
can afford to pay more for the commodity should not be privileged 
over those who cannot… where any important article becomes  
scarce, rationing is the democratic, equitable solution.” 
 
-President Franklin D. Roosevelt, ―Cost of Living‖ 
message to Congress, April 27, 1942.  
 
 
 
 After the Empire of Japan bombed Pearl Harbor, Americans braced themselves for what 
would surely be a long, hard-fought war.  In World War II, brave young United States soldiers 
made the ultimate sacrifice across the seas on both the European and Pacific fronts.  However, the 
millions of citizens on domestic soil also made countless sacrifices in a national mobilization to 
support the war effort.  People in Nevada and across the nation gave up everyday conveniences 
and seemingly ordinary items to show their support for the troops.  Government agencies 
instituted tight rationing guidelines on a variety of consumer goods.  Perhaps the most highly 
regulated rationing involved raw materials of the transportation sector.  Gasoline, rubber, steel, 
and aluminum were carefully rationed, and a limited supply was available to the public.  Other 
consumer goods such as clothes and shoes were rationed as well so that manufacturers could 
focus their production on the needs of the soldiers.  Perhaps above all, Americans remember the 
daily sacrifices of one of life‘s most basic necessities: food.  Dietary staples such as meat, coffee, 
and sugar were rationed to the consumer by the federal government.  Price ceilings and strict 
rationing regulations of food products resulted in widespread black market practices in Nevada 
and across the nation during World War II.  This essay will analyze the specific government 
policies and regulations placed on sugar, coffee, and meat, while exploring the public reactions 
and the consequential black market practices that became commonplace in American society. 
 Beginning in 1942, the federal government began laying the groundwork for food 
rationing programs in Nevada and across the nation.  Although rationing was contrary to the 
American culture of luxury and excess, government officials portrayed it as a way of showing 
patriotism and allegiance to one‘s country.  For many, food rationing interrupted daily patterns 
and habits of eating, from the customary morning coffee to the indulgent steak dinner.  In Eating 
for Victory, Amy Bentley writes, ―After all, choosing between a steak or chops for dinner was 
evidence of having obtained the American dream, with its emphasis on material abundance.‖
1
 
Government regulations of rationing did not favor those with money or discriminate against those 
without.  Every citizen was on an equal playing field to compete for scarce consumer resources.  
Deprivation of life‘s everyday conveniences was a way that Americans showed their support for 
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the war effort.  Although sometimes difficult, most US citizens realized that their sacrifices were 
not near that of American allies Great Britain and Russia. 
  The reasoning behind rationing embraced two key concepts: ―since resources were rare, 
they should be shared equally; and to control inflation, rationing should be used rather than 
leaving distribution to the free market system normally in place in America.‖
2
  Since most 
citizens accepted these two ideologies, criticism was minimal.  However, rationing alone would 
leave the market susceptible to hoarding, leading to inflation.  Economists argued that broad price 
controls over all sectors of the market were necessary.   
Paul F. Gemmill notes in his book American Economy in Wartime, ―The serious inflation 
which accompanied World War I enriched some persons while impoverishing others, and 
increased the cost of the war by about 150 percent.‖
3
  To avoid a similar situation in the emerging 
war, Wall Street financier Bernard Baruch urged the government to set broad price controls in his 
widely publicized article ―Priorities: The Synchronizing Force.‖  He argued that freezing only a 
select number of consumer goods would leave to ―human judgment‖ as to which goods were 
necessary to regulate pricing, and which were to remain dependent on market demand.  However, 
through wide-ranging price controls, ―human judgment‖ would not be a factor in determining 
which goods were to be regulated to appropriate price ceilings.  Baruch also contended that many 
prices were dependent on the level of other prices.  For example, food prices were subject to 
rising transportation costs due to the rationing of tires and fuel oil.  Baruch argued that 
widespread price controls were the only way to adequately prevent wartime inflation.
4
 
 In April 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the Office of Price 
Administration and Civilian Supply (OPACS).  Its main objectives were to stabilize market prices 
and prevent increases due to inflation, to prevent profiteering, hoarding, and speculation, to assist 
in assuring adequate production, and to protect those with fixed incomes from undue impairment 
of their living standards.  In August 1941, functions of the OPACS concerning civilian supply 
were transferred to the Office of Production Management, while the OPACS was truncated to the 
Office of Price Administration (OPA).  It limited the purchase of various commodities that were 
composed of raw materials in high demand for the war effort, such as automobiles, tires, and 
appliances.  Also, the OPA regulated the quantity of consumer goods to be rationed equally 
amongst the population such as gasoline, sugar, coffee, and meat.  The War Production Board 
(WPB) worked closely with the OPA to create a list of items that were necessary to ration for the 
war effort.  Automobiles, gasoline, and tires were among the first commodities to be rationed.  
Although plans for price regulation were already being drafted by the OPA, Congress passed the 
Emergency Price Control Act in January of 1942.  This Act placed the power of price control 
within the OPA, officially authorizing government jurisdiction over widespread price controls. 
Leon Henderson, the first Price Administrator of the OPA, became notorious for his unpopular 
methods of swift regulations instituted by the new administration.
5
  
 In May 1942, Congress passed the General Maximum Price Regulation (General 
Max).  The bill declared: 
 1.   Beginning May 18, 1942, retail prices of commodities and services, with  
             some exceptions, could not exceed the highest levels which each individual       
             seller charged during March 1942. 
 2.   Beginning May 11, 1942, manufacturing and wholesale prices and the  
             prices for wholesale and industrial services could not exceed the highest 
                  March levels for each seller. 
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3.   Beginning July 1, 1942, no individual could legally charge more for  
             services sold at retail in connection with a commodity than was charged  
             during March when that price ceiling went into effect. 
 
After enactment of the General Max legislation, the federal government extended price controls 
to nearly 90 percent of all foods sold at retail nationwide.
 6
 
As Nevadans began to accept rationing of fuel, oil, and rubber as a way of life, the first 
food that found itself in short supply was sugar.  War Ration Book One, the first in the history of 
the United States, was released May 4-May 7, 1942.   Over 123 million books were issued to the 
public nationwide.  The book was primarily issued to limit consumer purchases of sugar, down to 
twelve ounces per individual per week.  Industrial consumers had already been rationed to 80 
percent of the amounts purchased from the previous year.  Under the new rationing system, 
confectionary and beverage manufacturers were impacted the most.  Additionally, the book 
rationed for two pairs of shoes per person for the remainder of the year.
7
    
Sugar rationing was triggered by the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, which had 
cut off the large supply normally sourced from the islands.  Sugar cargoes from Hawaii were cut 
in half to conserve shipping labor diverted to military work.  Since the US had recently joined the 
Allied forces on the European front, considerable amounts of sugar were diverted to support 
those nations.  Other Mediterranean and Near East nations were allocated sugar to replace 
provisions previously supplied by Japan.
8
 
 In August 1941, Price Administrator Leon Henderson fixed a price ceiling for sugar 
imported from Cuba at $3.50 per one hundred pounds.  However, with the influence of Japanese 
forces on American sugar supply, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, an independent 
government agency, contracted to purchase the entire Cuban sugar output for the year of 1942.  
With the signing of the contract, Henderson agreed to raise the price ceiling to $3.74 per one 
hundred pounds, resulting in a consumer retail sale price of almost seven cents per pound.
9
  The 
estimated amount of sugar that was available per capita was about 80 pounds in 1942.  This was 
down from approximately 120 pounds per person in 1941.  By the beginning of November 1942, 
institutional users, including hotels and restaurants, were additionally cut down from 80 percent 
to 60 percent of the base established by the previous year‘s usage.  Sugar allotments for hospitals 
had been cut down to 85 percent of their established base.
10
 
 Coffee was the second foodstuff to be officially rationed by the government.  Henderson 
ordered nationwide rationing of coffee to go into effect November 28, 1942.  All citizens age 
fifteen and up were eligible to receive a ration of one pound every five weeks- about a cup a 
day.
11
   Stamps from Ration Book Number One were used to obtain coffee rations.  Leo F. 
Schmitt, Director of the Nevada OPA, announced that citizens who did not receive the first ration 
book because of excess sugar stock on hand at the time were allowed to receive a new copy of the 
ration book.  Additionally, they were allowed to sell any excess sugar supplies to eligible retailers 
or others holding proper certificates issued by the local war price rationing board.  Consumers 
selling sugar had to have permission from local war price rationing boards, and the sugar had to 
be sold in the original, unopened packages by the manufacturer.
12
  Furthermore, consumers that 
were holding a supply of coffee in excess of one pound when coffee rationing officially began, 
were required to report the personal supply, and consequently, surrender the according number of 
coffee ration stamps to the local war rationing board.
13
  Schmitt announced, ―No consumer shall 
acquire roasted coffee if he owns or possesses more than one pound of coffee for personal use, 
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and no person shall transfer roasted coffee to a consumer if he knows or has reason to believe that 
a consumer owns more than one pound of coffee for personal use.‖
14
 
  The OPA did not exercise any control over the service of coffee per patron in 
restaurants.  However, the WPB continued to restrict restaurant coffee supply purchases to 65 
percent of their base, established by 1941 figures.
15
  Just as the case with the sugar supply, the 
primary reason for the shortage of coffee was a lack of shipping capability and manpower, most 
of which had been diverted to the war effort.  An unnamed official of a coffee roasters association 
was quoted saying, ―The reason for the impending rationing of the beverage bean even now is the 
lack of shipping from Brazil and Central American republics, where coffee surpluses exists in 
millions of sacks.‖
16
 
 Meat was the third, and perhaps most notorious, raw food product to be rationed 
nationwide.  In early September 1942, the OPA took the first step toward total regulation of 
rationing meat supplies to civilians.  Officials placed the entire meat industry, from 
slaughterhouses to wholesalers, under a single unified licensing control.
17
  There was an 
unequivocal public awareness in Nevada of the shortage of meat.  In 1941, 20 billion pounds of 
beef, veal, pork, lamb, and mutton were produced nationally.  Of that amount, only 1½ billion 
pounds were designated to US armed forces.  Approximately 22 billion pounds of meat were 
projected to be produced in 1942; however, over 4 billion pounds were to be utilized by a much 
larger army at war. Nevertheless, upon applying those numbers to the population as a whole, the 
actual sacrifice required of each individual citizen was nominal.  An editorial writer in the Las 
Vegas Review Journal commented, ―We ought to welcome rationing—not dread it.  Rationing 
simply means spreading what supplies we do have EQUALLY among all of us.  Lack of 
rationing means some get more, some get less, others get none.  The sooner we ration, the sooner 
that kind of maldistribution ends.‖
18
 
The federal government introduced the ―Share the Meat‖ campaign in the late summer of 
1942.  Government officials urged Americans to limit their weekly meat intake to 2½ pounds per 
week for each adult, 1½ pounds per week for each child six to twelve years old, and ¾ pound per 
week for each child under six years old.  Officials hoped the campaign would persuade 
consumers to cut down on their meat consumption voluntarily, in hopes to prepare them for 
impending federally regulated meat rationing.  Though it was a sacrifice for families in the 
prosperous economic period of the 1940s, the rationed allowances were actually about the same 
amount of meat the average US citizen consumed in the Depression Era of the 1930s.
19
  Across 
Nevada, civilian organizations embraced the new ―Share the Meat‖ campaign.  For example, in 
November of 1942, twenty civilian defense block and neighborhood leaders in the town of Pioche 
organized a house-to-house campaign to show homemakers how to comply with the government 
program.  Under the request of the Office of Civilian Defense, local block and neighborhood 
leaders undertook the responsibility to reach every family to ―call to attention the necessity for 
voluntary rationing of meat, and to provide information concerning alternative foods for well-
balanced diets.‖
20
  
On September 24, 1942, Secretary of Agriculture Claude R. Wickard announced that the 
OPA had begun to prepare a plan for nationwide coupon meat rationing that was expected to be 
ready within two to three months.  Wickard called for a reduction of 21 percent of deliveries of 
meat for civilian consumption during the latter part of the year.  The Food Requirements 
Committee of the WPB called it ―only a temporary measure‖ to prolong the organization of the 
coupon rationing plan.  Wickard supported an appeal made by the Committee that citizens restrict 
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their meat consumption to 2½ pounds per week per person until the rationing plan began.  He 
advised that heavy consumption of meat during the winter season had to be discouraged until the 
meat rationing program was taken into effect early the following year.  Conversely, men in the 
armed forces were allowed twice the rationed portion of meat of American civilians.
21
 
By late December 1942 in Southern Nevada, the Clark County Board of Health passed 
rules and regulations regarding the slaughtering of animals for the sale of meat.  Under the new 
regulations, it was illegal for butchers, restaurant managers, or any other persons to purchase 
uninspected and unstamped meat.  Ranchers were also restricted by the OPA in the number of 
animals they could kill.  They were only allowed to slaughter an amount not exceeding the 
number slaughtered in the corresponding quarter of the previous year.  The OPA justified this as 
a conservative measure so that animals were not killed off too rapidly.  A state regulation known 
as the Hide and Carcass Inspection Law required that an authorized representative of the state 
Department of Agriculture inspect and record all brands and stamps on all livestock killed.
22
 
After a year of involvement in the war, a considerable amount of the nation‘s food supply 
was being utilized in support of both American and Allied troops in Europe in accordance with 
the Lend Lease program.  By the beginning of 1943, coffee and sugar were the only two foods 
officially rationed to American consumers.  However, there were many accounts nationwide of 
shortages of various foodstuffs for a variety of reasons all linked to the war effort.  In December 
of 1942, Las Vegas‘s milk and farm produce supply from the Virgin and Moapa valleys were 
threatened by gas rationing restrictions.  Farmers from the valleys hauled thousands of gallons of 
milk to the Las Vegas area on a daily basis.  However, one farmer claimed that his total gas 
allotment for three months only lasted him less than one week.  Certificates of war necessity that 
had been distributed to farmers did not allow for sufficient gas for most to operate.  
Approximately three-fifths of the entire milk supply of Las Vegas was delivered from the two 
valleys, and without allowances made for transportation, the city was threatened with a serious 
shortage.  Warren Hardy, Chairman of the Clark County USDA, appealed to the OPA through a 
Washington congressional delegation from Nevada.  Hardy called for the establishment of local 
temporary OPA offices in each of the Moapa and Virgin valleys due to the distance away from 
the county seat.  Upon approval, these offices established immediate relief of gas rations through 
local issuance of certificates of war necessity to farmers, instead of the lengthy application to the 
central Detroit office.
23
  This was just one case that reflects the economic challenges that were 
threatening the nation, due to a domino effect of rationing on one industry hindering another. 
With tight ration restrictions placed on gasoline and tires, distribution was the major 
challenge to Nevada‘s food supply.  By January 1943, Secretary of Agriculture Wickard 
disclosed that extensive reforms were necessary in the nation‘s food distribution system in order 
to fulfill economic demands and prevent a rise in prices to consumers.  Wickard‘s first step was 
to revise milk distribution practices with a program that would conserve manpower, fuel, rubber, 
and delivery equipment.  The new program restricted milk containers to larger sizes, prohibited 
milk delivery persons from leaving an ―extra quart‖, and required a minimum deposit on each 
bottle.  Restaurants and hotels were limited to conducting business with not more than two 
suppliers, and were not allowed to return un-sold milk.
24
 
War Ration Book Two was released in Nevada and nationwide March 1, 1943.  This book 
introduced a far more widespread rationing system for a variety of processed foods, canned 
goods, and most notably, meat.  Numbers on the ration book worked as a type of point system, 
each systematically designated to a specific category of foodstuff.  Henderson resident Kay 
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Dwyer vividly remembers, ―I don‘t recall what numbers we had, but I do remember that 
everything was rationed.  We had rationing on all canned goods and on meats, even flour and 
sugar.‖  However, not all foods were tightly rationed.  She continued, ―Many of the food items 
were redirected to the military because we had so many people—so many men in the military—
that many of the food items like the canned goods, the nonperishable goods, were diverted to the 
military; whereas, we had fresh fruit and vegetables.  They were not rationed because they 
couldn‘t be transported.‖
25
  Processed and canned foods had begun to be rationed as of February 
2, 1943, and meats and fats officially became rationed on March 29, 1943.
26
 
As shortages and rationing became facts of life for the people of Nevada, the advertising 
industry was faced with playing two important roles in creating public awareness and rallying 
public support.  First and foremost, advertisers strived to keep the public informed about which 
products faced a shortage, which would be rationed, and which were totally unavailable.  The ad 
industry‘s far more difficult task was finding ways to help civilians on the home front cope with 
rationing and shortages, and accept them as the individual‘s virtuous contribution to the war 
effort.
27
  During the wartime years, Nevada experienced a booming economy statewide, from a 
prosperous mining industry around Reno, to a growing casino industry in Las Vegas, to the vital 
Basic Magnesium Incorporated (BMI) plant in Henderson.  With such tremendous prosperity 
among citizens of the state, many were less than pleased to scale back on rationed basic 
foodstuffs. 
Since many of the traditional commercial institutions found themselves with a relatively 
low production output, the majority of war ads shifted from a focus of selling products and 
services to ―something more closely resembling public relations.‖
28
   Institutional ads were 
designed to keep brand and company names before the public while their manufacturers had little 
or nothing to sell.  While sustaining brand consciousness, these ads also aimed to lift morale on 
the home front.  For example, ads were created to show people how the proper use of ration 
points was not only good for the country and the war, but that it also helped them sustain as 
comfortable a lifestyle as possible for themselves.  In addition to corporate advertising, the federal 
government established the War Advertising Council, which rolled out ad campaigns focusing on 
rationing and anti-inflation.  Advertisements discouraged extravagant and unnecessary spending 
on non-rationed items, and urged consumers to practice ―thoughtful buying,‖ or buying only what 
one needed.
 29
  The public was persuaded to redirect their extra disposable incomes into 
investments beneficial for the war effort such as War Bonds. 
As Nevadans‘ tolerances of rationing and meat shortages began to wane, government 
officials realized that people on the home front needed to feel their desires were important and 
that the government was doing its utmost to make sure civilians were recognized and rewarded 
for their support of the war.  The OPA advisors knew that for Americans to continue to comply 
with rationing guidelines, they would need to feel that sacrificing coveted red meat was actually 
―for the good of the country‖.  In December 1943, the OPA launched a public awareness 
campaign that promoted meat as being crucial to the war effort.  Essentially, officials reasoned 
that those doing the actual fighting were most deserving of meat.  A pamphlet from the OPA 
read: 
American meat is a fighting food.  It‘s an important part of a military man‘s diet, giving 
him energy to outfight the enemy.  It helped the Americans drive the Japs from 
Guadalcanal.  It‘s feeding our troops on world battlefronts.  It helped sustain the heroic 
British 8
th
 Army in its blistering drive from Egypt to Tunisia.  It aided the Red Army in 
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breaking the German lines at Stalingrad and Leningrad.  It‘s helping Soviet troopers roll 
the Axis forces back.  Meat from our farms and packing houses is playing a part almost on 
par with tanks, planes, and bullets.
30
 
 
American troops in the field were fed meat at least three times a week.  The finer cuts of meat—
steaks, chops, and roasts—were highly allocated for the war effort.  About 60 percent of ―U.S. 
Choice‖ grade cuts of beef was reserved for military consumption.
31
  An article appearing in the 
January 1943 issue of LIFE magazine encouraged civilians to sacrifice their preference of choice 
cuts for other far less popular ―variety meats‖.  The article justified, ―The army does not want the 
‗variety meats‘ because they spoil easily, take time to prepare, and the men don‘t like them.‖
32
  
Instead, American consumers were asked to cope with these inconveniences.  Instead of 
presenting valid reasons to justify the heavy allocation of the American meat supply to military 
forces, the OPA‘s campaign almost backfired by increasing public unrest and demeaning the 
worth and hard work of civilians doing their part on the home front to support the war effort. 
 As officials implemented the meat rationing program in March 1943, consumer black 
markets and industry-wide black market practices shortly ensued.  An article on the front page of 
the Las Vegas Review Journal in May 1943 proclaimed, ―There IS a black market in Las 
Vegas.‖
33
  The article, just like many others, gave little information or evidence of black markets 
in Nevada, but rather served as anti-black market propaganda.  It compared a citizen taking 
advantage of the black market to a soldier that had deserted his company in the face of the enemy.  
Shortly after meat rationing took effect, there was no local government enforcement of rationing 
restrictions in Nevada, ―except the conscience of the individual consumer.‖  The writer of the 
editorial concludes forcefully, ―We can‘t be worried about the chiseler and his black market.  We 
don‘t want anything to do with either—they‘re traitors in time of emergency and not worthy of 
the name American.‖
34
 
A myriad of locally sponsored advertisements appeared in newspapers, magazines, and 
public posters across Nevada.  Ads urged consumers to ―never buy rationed foods without giving 
up ration stamps, and never pay more than the ceiling price.‖
35
  Ads focused on informing 
unknowing consumers that if they bought rationed foods without ration stamps, then they were 
indeed helping to maintain the black market.  Local merchants urged citizens to take action 
against profiteers, stating, ―If a food dealer tries to sell you rationed goods without collecting 
ration stamps—or, if he tries to charge you more than the ceiling price—he is a Black Market 
operator.  Report him to the nearest OPA office or to the US District Attorney.‖
36
 
 There was clear public resentment of the black market and black market practices in 
Nevada and across the nation.  However, since the OPA had a limited budget, little policing was 
done beyond routine inspections of meat packing houses to prevent black market practices.  
Therefore, the primary concern of officials was educating the public, inasmuch they would 
actually be able to identify black markets, while not inadvertently participating.  Chester Bowles 
addressed the public at length on these scenarios.  Bowles became the Price Administrator of the 
OPA in 1943, after Leon Henderson was forced to resign from the post due to overwhelming 
public discontent, and after Prentiss Brown covered the post for a short six-month stint in 1943.  
Bowles‘s tenure as Price Administrator was more highly praised than that of his predecessors.
37
 
 A lengthy article published in The New York Times on March 1, 1944 put into print 
Bowles‘s public address at the New York Times Hall from the previous day.  Bowles called black 
markets, ―one of the most misunderstood subjects in the country.‖
38
  He noted that few people 
 36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
actually knew how they worked, how big they were, or what was being done to stamp them out.  
The Administrator estimated that between 3-4 percent of the average cost of all food was due to 
black market operations.  Essentially, the black market in food was a $1.2 billion industry, of 
which meat was the predominant component.  However, Bowles insisted that the overwhelming 
majority of merchants were honest, and though oftentimes irritated by OPA regulations, they 
were anxious to comply.  Merchants realized that price ceilings were essential as wartime 
measures to defeat inflation, and they resented chiselers who violated these laws for their own 
profit.
39
 
 Price Administrator Bowles addressed the major black market practices of the meat 
industry.  Some meat sales operated completely outside the OPA rationing system, where cattle 
would be stolen from ranches, butchered in unlicensed slaughterhouses or even fields, and sold 
into private trade.  So-called ―tie-in‖ agreements were more widely used black market techniques.  
Wholesalers and retail butchers were offered all the steaks they could buy at regulated ceiling 
prices, provided they also purchase an oversupply of undesirable ―variety meats‖, such as hearts, 
kidneys, and tripe.  The butcher or wholesaler conceded to the variety meats being sold at a loss 
or not at all; however, he would make up the difference in the sale of the steaks, which would be 
sold at above ceiling prices.  Another type of clever manipulation to bypass price ceilings would 
occur when a retailer would bet his supplier that he would not be able to deliver to him desired 
cuts of steak.  When the delivery would be made, the retailer would pay the supplier on the side 
for his proposed bet, while still adhering to the price ceilings on the cost of the meat.  The retailer 
would then charge his customers over the ceiling prices.  Yet another black market practice of the 
meat industry involved simple bootlegging.  A wholesaler or retailer would place an order with a 
supplier, but then be told that a representative will stop in to confirm the order with them.  Before 
the product was delivered, a man would stop in, demand a certain payment, and then confirm the 
product would be delivered on schedule at the ceiling price.  Upon delivery, the supplier 
upgraded less expensive cuts of meat; for example, a sirloin or flank cut might have been 
upgraded to a more expensive tenderloin or ribeye.
40
 
 Black markets were equally a major challenge to the OPA, honest food retailers, and law-
abiding citizens.  However, the first step in abolishing black markets was a broader understanding 
of the size and extent of the danger on the part of the general public.  Chester Bowles advocated, 
―Black markets without customers quickly disappear.  If tomorrow morning the American 
people—all of them—should make up their mind never again to pay more than the ceiling prices 
or to purchase any product without ration stamps, our black market problem would disappear in 
short order.‖
41
  The second step in putting an end to black markets was educating retailers and 
wholesalers of their role in society in adhering to OPA regulations in order to keep the cost of 
living from rising.  The OPA also worked with retailers and wholesalers by establishing 
―compliance divisions.‖  These departments worked closely with businesses to ―distinguish 
between deliberate chiseling and carelessness.‖  The OPA also organized ―price panel volunteers‖ 
on the local level to assist and advise merchants, and to detect black market practices.
42
  The OPA 
combated the black market at the source by focusing on pre-retail operations of ranchers, and 
their distribution to suppliers.  By 1946, the OPA had filed over 470 actions in Nevada, 
California, and across the nation to stop illegal slaughtering of cattle.  Officials felt that black 
markets could be restrained if their sources of illegal meat were cut off.
43
  
 In the midst of the OPA‘s constant battle with black markets, citizens and business 
owners in Nevada were doing their part in the fight as well.  In late July of 1945, members of the 
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Las Vegas Restaurant Owners Association announced a new campaign called ―Meatless Days.‖  
On Mondays and Tuesdays, no red meat of any kind was served or offered for sale at any 
restaurant, café, hotel, or at any other member of the Association.
44
  Business owners justified 
this program, reminiscent of World War I, as a way of staying in business to be able to continue 
to serve their loyal patrons.  ―Meatless Days‖ was also somewhat used as a campaign tool against 
the rationing regulations of the OPA.  Business owners felt that overly tight restrictions of ration 
points actually encouraged black markets.  Instead of meat going into the hands of honest 
business owners and millions of homes, it instead was diverted to the black market because of 
insufficient ration points to make those purchases.  The Las Vegas Restaurant Association 
pledged, ―in order to stay in business and serve the people of Southern Nevada, (we) have 
declared two meatless days per week beginning Monday, July 23, and each week thereafter, until 
this situation is cleared and the OPA in Washington authorizes additional points for the purchase 
of meat through legitimate channels.‖
45
  
 Nevada and the rest of the nation served as the third battlefront of World War II, and the 
Office of Price Administration was the neutral ambassador caught in the crossfire. Criticism and 
praise was dealt equally to the OPA throughout the war.  The constant struggle to balance the 
Allied forces‘ military needs with public demand and public opinion was a battle in itself.  
Although national mobilization to support the war effort empowered armies insomuch that they 
were able to defeat the Axis forces, Nevada and the American public were left with fractured 
opinions on morale issues of the legitimacy of rationing, price control, and black markets.  Price 
ceilings and tight rationing restrictions on the food staples of sugar, coffee, and meat undoubtedly 
assisted the war effort and curbed inflation on the home front.  However, at the same time, these 
regulations created mass public discontent, along with the emergence of a widespread black 
market.  The market thrived on a lack of enforcement, poor public knowledge of regulations, and, 
most ironically, the mass unrelenting pursuit of tradition, luxury, excess, and all that is the 
American Dream. 
Epilogue 
 
By December 12, 1946, most functions of the Office of Price Administration were transferred to 
the newly established Office of Temporary Controls.  The Financial Reporting Division was 
transferred to the Federal Trade Commission.  On March 14, 1947, Price Administrator Chester 
Bowles issued the General Liquidation Order.  The OPA was officially abolished on May 29, 
1946. 
 
 
 
“The war and rationing had, I think, the most profound effect  
on our culture, on our economy, on everything 
because it was so all-enveloping. 
 
- Kay Dwyer, Henderson, NV 
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